Rhetoric in the Gorgias
There is little question that Plato shows his loathing for rhetoric in the Gorgias, especially as exemplified by the rhetorical skills the Sophists practice and preach. Rhetoric is a sham art, its practitioners are falsifiers of truth who use words to convince ignorant people that they have knowledge when in fact they have nothing more than the semblance of knowledge. Through Socrates he claims that "the orator need have no knowledge of the truth about things; it is enough for him to have discovered a knack of convincing the ignorant that he knows more than the experts".
3 Rhetoric, therefore, deals in the appearance of knowledge and has little regard for cultivating or for instilling in hearers true wisdom. Philosophy on the other hand is a noble activity because it strives to realize the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Rhetoric has to do with superficial and false knowledge, philosophy with deep learning and truth.
Plato takes his hardest stance on rhetoric in the Gorgias. He not only denies it the status of art, he declares it to be an imposter, nothing more than a talent for pleasing that is gained by routine and fobbed off as art. Rhetoric is, he says, similar to cookery; Socrates explains to Gorgias in this dialogue that rhetoric and cookery are both "subdivisions" under the same general category of "pandering":
Well, Gorgias, the whole of which oratory is a branch seems to me to be a pursuit which has nothing to do with art but which requires in its practicing a shrewd and bold spirit together with a natural aptitude for dealing with men. The generic name which I should give it is pandering; it has many subdivisions, one of which is cookery, an occupation which masquerades as an art but in my opinion is no more than knack acquired by routine. I should classify oratory and beauty-culture and popular lecturing as species of the same genus. 4 Socrates refuses to grant rhetoric the status of an art because to him it is merely a way of pandering to aesthetic appetites, no different in that regard than cookery or public amusements. 5 Like cookery, rhetoric has no methodical way of classifying and defining its knowledge and practices, and therefore no method of judging the quality of what is produced. Instead, they both rely on a person's natural endowments, which are cultivated through experience and routine.
With rhetoric and cookery grouped together, Plato places them both in opposition to medicine. As Socrates explains, cookery, just like rhetoric, is a superfi-cial form of intelligence while medicine, on the other hand, inquires systematically into its subject matter to arrive at true knowledge:
In my opinion cookery, unlike medicine, is a knack, not an art, and I added that, whereas medicine studies the nature of the patient before it treats him and knows the reasons which dictate its actions and can give a rational account of both, cookery on the other hand approaches in a thoroughly unmethodical way even that pleasure which is the sole object of its ministrations; it makes no study of the nature of pleasure or of the causes which produce it, but with practically no attempt at rational calculation is content to record as a matter of routine and experience what normally occurs, and is enabled to purvey its pleasures by this means. 6 Rhetoric and cookery cannot provide a "rational account" of their practices, nor can they explain the reasons behind their actions and procedures. They make no attempt at "rational calculation" but rather proceed haphazardly with limited knowledge gleaned through experience. A true art like medicine, on the other hand, studies the nature of its methods and practices and can provide reasons and justifications for its procedures. Clearly, then, rhetoric and medicine in the Gorgias are defined by their palpable and essential differences.
In the opposition that Plato draws between rhetoric and medicine, medicine acts as the standard against which rhetoric must be measured. In view of this standard, rhetoric is not an art because its practitioners do not inquire, as doctors do, into a subject's true nature, proceeding instead haphazardly without exact methods or precision in their practices. Driven by the desire to chase fashions and opinions instead of attempting to gain true knowledge, the rhetorician adorns his discourse, according to Socrates, in a way that makes him appear knowledgeable to those who do not know any better: the general public. At one point in the dialogue, Socrates and Gorgias illustrate the opposition between knowledge and ignorance, knowing and seeming to know, by explicit reference to the opposition between the rhetor and the physician:
Socrates. You said just now that even on matters of health the orator will be more convincing than the doctor. Gorgias. Before a popular audience-yes, I did. Socrates. A popular audience means an ignorant audience, doesn't it? He won't be more convincing than the doctor before experts, I presume. Gorgias. True. Socrates. Now, if he is more convincing than the doctor he is more convincing than the expert? Gorgias. Naturally. Socrates. And the non-doctor, presumably, is ignorant of what the doctor knows? Gorgias. Obviously.
Socrates. So when the orator is more convincing than the doctor, what happens is that an ignorant person is more convincing than the expert before an equally ignorant audience. Am I right? Gorgias. That is what happens in that case, no doubt. Socrates. And the same will be true of the orator in relation to all the other arts. The orator need have no knowledge of the truth about things; it is enough for him to have discovered a knack of convincing the ignorant that he knows more than the experts.
7
That note is struck often in the dialogue. The doctor is "a man who has learnt…the [true] character which knowledge of that subject confers". 8 Socrates groups "the art of medicine among those which are concerned with good" 9 and "with the highest welfare of body and soul".
10 But "the pseudo-art of the pander… has no accurate knowledge, " so rhetoric and cookery put "on the guise of each of the genuine arts pretend[ing] to be the art which it is impersonating"-medicine in both these cases.
11 As a final criterion of the true techne, Socrates points to medicine once again: "medicine studies the nature of the patient before it treats him and knows the reasons which dictate its actions and can give a rational account of both".
12 Once again, rhetoric pales in comparison because "it has no rational account to give of the nature of the various things which it offers".
13
A closer reading of the Gorgias, though, suggests that the opposition between rhetoric and medicine loses its starkness as soon as the possibility for a "good" rhetoric appears over the intellectual horizon. This rhetoric, we come to learn, does not say what people want to hear-it does not pander to the aesthetic and linguistic appetites of individuals for the sake of flattering, gratifying, and pleasing-but what people need to hear in order to better their souls:
There are two kinds of political oratory, one of them is pandering and base clap-trap; only the other is good, which aims at the edification of the souls of the citizens and is always striving to say what is best, whether it be welcome or unwelcome to the ears of the audience. But I don't believe that you have ever experienced the second type.
14 The first type of oratory, what Socrates calls a false rhetoric, is defined in terms of what it seeks: pleasure and gratification. By direct contrast, "good" rhetoric is defined in terms of the "betterment" and "improvement" of others, the "edification Ibid, 503 of the soul." Good rhetoric is like medicine, bolstering the soul and promoting its healthy functioning.
"Good" rhetoric is cast not as an ideal but as an all-too-rare occurrence, something one does not get to hear in the assembly. Nevertheless, far from a remote ideal, "good" rhetoric seems to be eminently possible, exemplified in fact by speeches every politician could deliver but chooses not to, opting instead to please and flatter audiences by pandering to them. Socrates says to Callicles, Do the speakers in your opinion make it the constant aim of their speeches to improve their fellow-citizens as much as possible, or do they too set out merely to gratify their hearers, sacrificing the public interest to their own personal success, and treating their audience like children, whom their only object is to please, without caring whether the effect of their speeches is improving or the reverse?
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Socrates' view on political oratory is that it is self-interested and functions to please and gratify hearers, rather than to improve and better them by saying what is good and true. Good political oratory-which is possible, though politicians choose not to engage in it-is like medicine, aiming at the betterment of people, the welfare of their souls.
In the Gorgias, then, Plato qualifies that sharp opposition he drew between rhetoric and medicine. This opposition, we come to know, describes only the relationship between the type of rhetoric practiced in the assembly, and the idea of medicine that Plato compares it to. But another version of rhetoric, available to political orators though they choose not to practice it, stands not in opposition to medicine but in close relation to it. With this qualification, the stage is already set for a fuller treatment of "good" rhetoric in Phaedrus.
Rhetoric in the Phaedrus
In his later dialogue Phaedrus, Plato's attack on rhetoric eases and makes room for the possibility of a "true" art of rhetoric that is analogous to the art of healing. The Phaedrus develops this theme of a good kind of political oratory that Plato only hints at in the Gorgias.16 Largely guided by an analogy with medicine, the new conception of rhetoric creates a strong impression that rhetoric and medicine are not as far apart from each other's intellectual and practical embrace as Plato would initially have us believe. 17 15 Ibid., 502-503. 16 Intensive investigation into an individual dialogue like Phaedrus helps to give an inside feel of Plato's philosophy, particularly the juxtaposition of persuasive myth and formal argument, which in the end reinforce one another. For a thorough understanding of this juxtaposition, see G.R.F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 17 Joel Warren Lidz, "Medicine as Metaphor in Plato", The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 20:5, 1995, 527-541. Though the Phaedrus discusses such topics as love, immortality, poetry, the soul, and myths, the dialogue's focal point is discourse and rhetoric, and the action of the dialogue begins and ends on this subject.
18 It starts with a conversation between Socrates and young Phaedrus, a student of the well-known orator Lysias. Phaedrus is a lover of rhetoric, and he has just come from Epicrates' house, highly excited by a speech delivered by Lysias, which he heard there. He praises the speech as "clever" because it advances a novel position on love. He also claims that it is "marvelously eloquent, especially in its use of language." Being a lover of discourse himself, Socrates is eager to hear Lysias' speech. Phaedrus initially keeps hidden from Socrates the fact that he has the written text of the speech on his person-tucked under his cloak-but Socrates discovers it and convinces Phaedrus to let him hear it, not just to summarize its main points, but to read from the written manuscript.
Already in the beginning of the dialogue, speech is associated with pleasure, seduction, and superficial attraction. Socrates refers to Lysias' discourse as a pharmakon, a drug that draws Socrates outside the walls of the city, a place where he would otherwise not normally venture. In "Plato's Pharmacy, " Jacques Derrida argues convincingly that the pharmakon is an ambiguous term in the dialogue that can refer to a variety of (sometimes contradictory) meanings in ancient Greek. 19 Nevertheless, the context and the meaning of this passage seem clear: popular speeches like Lysias' seem to charm and enthrall. On the surface they appear beautiful, good, and true, but upon closer inspection they prove ugly, bad, and false. With Lysias' speech, the false rhetoric pointed to in the Gorgias acquires a more complete demonstration.
Lysias' speech is the first of three delivered in the dialogue. It argues that it is better to be a non-lover (to be the object of someone's affection) than it is to be a true lover (to be in love). It is better, in other words, not to care for one's lover, to engage in relationships purely for self-interest, than actually to be in love and, as sometimes happens, to allow your interests to be superseded by those of another. Socrates is unimpressed with Lysias' speech and pledges to offer a better discourse on the same subject. Socrates then delivers two speeches. The first follows in the same spirit as Lysias': it praises the evil lover. In the second Socrates offers a corrective to the alleged impiousness of the first.
These three speeches set the tone for the main event of the dialogue: Socrates and Phaedrus' discussion about the possibilities and limitations of rhetoric and writing. After Socrates' second speech, the style of the Phaedrus shifts from speeches to an extensive discussion and analysis of rhetoric and writing. 20 It is possible that the three speeches on love can be read allegorically, as Richard Weaver has shown, and as a preview for the main focus of the dialogue. 21 In other words, to practice rhetoric one should study the true nature of the subject under discussion, not merely pursue it for matters of self-interest and personal gratification (as would a non-lover). While the first two speeches fail to convey sufficient knowledge about the subject matter addressed, Socrates' second speech exhibits knowledge of love that is solidly in the speaker's possession. Based on that criterion, Socrates declares, "He who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all".
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Thus far, the tenor of the Phaedrus follows much of the Gorgias in its stance on rhetoric. Here, too, Plato rebukes rhetoricians because, as Phaedrus has heard, one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.
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Orators steer people away from the truth because they practice a false rhetoric of appearances. They persuade ignorant people to think that they actually possess real knowledge when in fact they have no more than beliefs and opinions, the appearance of knowledge. Appearances deceive, and the Sophists, then, are deceivers in the matter of wisdom. They know only the "preliminary to rhetoric, " a prelude to the real art.
24 A large portion of the Phaedrus is animated by the idea that rhetoricians are concerned only with what is seemly, that they possess no real desire to learn the true nature of their (alleged) art of speech. Their practices lack "scientific" knowledge, which any art, if it is to be considered a techne, must possess.
Yet the Phaedrus will go on to offer a changed conception of rhetoric and to provide a changed portrayal of its relation to medicine. the form and function of the rhetoric they practice and teach. 25 To him the Sophists are still charlatans who use an uninformed rhetoric to produce conviction in listeners without any concern for the wellbeing of their souls. In the context of speeches about love, caring for others becomes an important issue, bringing notions of welfare, wellbeing, and health to the forefront. Along with being harmonious with the goals of medicine, rhetoric is directed, following the example of medicine, toward what Jacqueline de Romilly refers to as "a science of dialectics".
26 Even though Plato does not retract his previous stance on rhetoric and his criticism of how it is practiced, the Phaedrus balances that more critical stance through endorsing an informed and methodical type of rhetoric, which can be compared to medicine and which aims to improve the health of a listener's soul.
The Method of a True Art of Rhetoric
The opposition that Plato draws between rhetoric and medicine on the basis of a true techne is called into question in the Gorgias and becomes unstable in the Phaedrus. A connection between rhetoric and medicine becomes tenable as soon as Plato links rhetoric with the audience's souls. 27 For the first time, Plato defines rhetoric as "leading souls through persuasion, " a definition perhaps designed to raise the question, "Where does rhetoric lead the soul to? The right or the wrong place? Toward health or toward sickness?" The definition, in other words, already suggests that rhetoric works on souls precisely the same way that medicine works on bodies, either to poison or to cure them. That rhetoric leads the soul already suggests the duty of the rhetorician to know the soul's destination, precisely in the way that a physician has the duty to know the body's orientation toward health.
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Socrates is quite explicit in describing how one should go about developing and practicing a true art of rhetoric. The first step is to learn about the different types of souls: "Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul".
29 A true art of speech requires knowledge of the various forms of the soul and a systematic attempt to classify them accordingly. Because a good rhetoric, as Socrates states in the Gorgias, 25 Edwin Black, "Plato's View of Rhetoric, " Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44:4, 1958, 361-374. 26 deals in "the edification of souls, " one must know the true nature of the soul in order to direct it toward the Good. 30 A great deal of the second half of the Phaedrus is animated by Socrates' refusal to admit that rhetoricians, especially the Sophists, possess an art, basing this refusal repeatedly on the claim that they know nothing about the souls of their audiences: "He who is to develop an art of rhetoric, " Socrates says in the Phaedrus, "must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class". 31 For how can one practice the art of leading souls without knowing about the true nature of the soul?
The second step is to learn how to align the right discourse with the right soul. A speaker must learn to classify the various classes of souls in order to learn how best to match types of discourses and types of souls appropriately. Certain speeches are fitting and appropriate, naturally and organically, to certain classes of people. This natural fit must be discovered a priori: "Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds: these we must classify".
32 Like a philosopher, the rhetorician must break down, classify, and define the types of discourses that are relevant to classes of souls and fit them together like matching pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. The matching is not done haphazardly but rather by discovering the right fit between soul and speech.
33 Certain speech is persuasive only on certain individuals: "Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded".
34 Rhetoric must be systematized to account for the various possibilities and combinations of matching discourses and souls.
While knowledge of the soul's destination, the types of souls, and the matching of discourses and souls require an a priori procedure, the incorporation of this knowledge into the domain of human affairs involves practicability and empirically derived discernment:
The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in 30 Gorg., 503. 31 Phaedr., 263b. 32 Ibid., 271d. 33 Rollin Quimby, "The Growth of Plato's Perception of Rhetoric", Philosophy and Rhetoric, 7:2, 1974, 71-79 . 34 Phaedr., 271d. a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action of belief.
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A keen awareness of timing and sensitivity to situational requirements must complement knowledge of discourses and souls. After knowledge of the various souls and types of speech has been acquired, and when rhetoricians have learned to yoke them together in practical affairs, they must learn also about the occasions for speaking and the styles of speech that suit these occasions:
When he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely finished; and if anyone who omits any of these points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the better man.
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A rhetorician's art is incomplete-and it will not come to fruition-until it is guided by wisdom about the right time to speak and the right time to remain silent, or about the proper speech for the occasion. Paralleling the Sophistic emphasis on "right timing" and kairos (opportune moment), Socrates makes clear that speech must be appropriate with respect to timing and suitability. Paying attention to matters of timing is a prerequisite to practicing a good rhetoric.
Evidence from the Hippocratic Corpus suggests that Plato is dealing for rhetoric the very same dilemma that Hippocratic physicians of the time were dealing with: how to intervene in medical situations in a timely manner, on the basis of experiences offered from the past. Once again, Plato's wall between rhetoric and medicine begins to crumble as the connection between them becomes stronger. In theoretical matters, rhetoric must follow the a priori procedures of medicine. In practical matters, it must follow the situational and timely procedures of medicine. Just as a doctor must know about the principles of health and sickness, but remain open to the particularities and peculiarities of his individual cases, so too the rhetorician must first arrive at theoretical principles and then heed situational requirements and adapt his message accordingly.
Plato's sudden concern with situational demands in the Phaedrus is a striking departure from the Gorgias and from the distinction he draws in it between rhetoric and medicine. The initial opposition Plato develops was based on his critique, structured on the fundamental idea that rhetoric should be philosophically driven as well as grounded on dialectical principles of inquiry, classification, and definition. Plato believes that through dialectic comes truth, and rhetoric that is guided 35 Ibid., 271e-272a. 36 Ibid., by truth is complementary and useful to the goals of philosophy. The problem with popular practices of rhetoric, he argues, is that it is inadequately informed, works on people's beliefs and opinions, and offers no more than the appearance of knowledge. False rhetoric, like the oratorical practices of the Sophists, is antithetical to the aims of philosophy. 37 Plato has us believe that a "scientific" study of rhetoric, as Socrates calls it, should advance from first principles, not from inducing theory from practical experience. A true rhetoric proceeds, therefore, with reasoning and rational calculation. 38 It is grounded by first principles. Socrates reminds us in the Phaedrus that "if a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?". 39 These truths are to be discovered external to the context of any speaking engagement. They exist in a metaphysical sense, not in the material world.
But now when Plato discusses the true art of rhetoric in the Phaedrus, he begins to contradict the very principles that support the initial opposition he drew between rhetoric and medicine. In fact, he submits that it is not enough for rhetoric to be grounded in truth, and a rhetorician needs to go on much more than knowledge of the souls of his auditors. Good rhetoric requires one to be versatile in face of practical situations, accounting for matters of timing and knowledge alike, adapting its art to contingent matters, matters that can never be theorized in advance.
The Good Orator, Pericles
Even though the presumption made by Plato's readers about the relationship between the doctor and rhetorician-residing as they do in the domains of required knowledge about the body and soul, respectively-becomes justified, the dialogue advances in ways that make this relationship explicit, first with regard to false medicine and false rhetoric. A true rhetoric heals souls a medicine heals bodies, since Socrates believes that the method of medicine is much the same as that of rhetoric.
All arts allure imposters, however, and only a true art of medicine should be the model for a true art of rhetoric. A false medicine is no better than a false rhetoric.
Socrates. Tell me; if anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus or to his father Acumenus and should say "I know how to apply various drugs to people, so as to make them warm or, if I wish, cold, and I can make them vom- 37 The rhetorician/sophist and philosopher are not always easy to distinguish, even when represented by Plato. Philosophy is not rhetoric free, and rhetoric is not devoid of philosophical content. See Marina McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 38 James S Murray, "Disputation, Deception, and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric (Phaedrus 261-266)", Philosophy and Rhetoric, 21:4, 1988, 279-289. 39 Phaedr., it, if I like, or can make their bowels move, and all that sort of thing; and because of this knowledge I claim that I am a physician and can make any other man a physician, to whom I impart the knowledge of these things"; what do you think they would say? Phaedrus. They would ask him, of course, whether he knew also whom he ought to cause to do these things, and when, and how much. Socrates. If then he should say: "No, not at all; but I think that he who has learned these things from me will be able to do by himself the things you ask about"? Phaedrus. They would say, I fancy, that the man was crazy and, because he had read something in a book or had stumbled upon some medicines, imagined that he was a physician when he really had no knowledge of the art. 40 Plato is making a comparison here between the "crazy" physician and the false orator on the basis of the effects they can each produce. A person who knows how to produce effects on the body with his drugs is not necessarily a doctor; he may indeed lack knowledge about the body. Likewise, the rhetorician who elicits emotions from his audience and is able to sway them in one direction or another has no greater understanding of the souls of his audience than the pseudo-doctor has of his patient's bodies. A true art consists in more than producing effects; it must be able to provide a rational account of its methods and procedures.
The comparison between rhetoric and medicine, then, is also made on the basis of proper knowledge. In medicine and rhetoric, knowing merely the body or the soul is not enough since one has to also know the entire man.
Socrates. Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man? Phaedrus. If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way. Socrates. He is right my friend.
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One must know the propensity of man to aspire toward the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, and Plato wants to position the soul within the context of true knowledge-this to him is the complete nature of man. Socrates agrees that the nature of the soul can only be learned by understanding the body holistically. Not just any medicine will do; Plato suggests toward the end of the dialogue that only Hippocratic medicine is the method of art rhetoric follow. Hippocratic medicine is special and unique because, compared with the majority of healers in ancient Greece, the Hippocratics are the most rational, calculating, and philosophical.
42 They take pains 40 Ibid., 268a-c. 41 Ibid., 270c. 42 Moes, Mark, "Plato's Conception of the Relations between Moral Philosophy and Medicine", Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 44:3, 2001, 363-366. to study the body in a systematic manner, and they are the only healers in Greece, as far as we know, who drafted case studies and field notes for later study and analysis.
Since "all great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature, " Socrates advises apprenticing with a healer, a person of high thoughts, to complement natural speaking talent with inquiry into nature. Pericles, Socrates thinks, is just such a person who learned from Anaxagoras the method of the art of healing and added this to his natural facility with language.
Socrates. All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking what is of use to it. Phaedrus. What do you mean by that? Socrates. The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.
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Rhetoric and medicine become identical to each other in the image of Pericles, one of the greatest orators in ancient Athens. It is because of Pericles' studies in medicine blended with his natural endowments in rhetoric that he is for Plato representative of a good rhetorician.
Corporeality and Writing
Drawing on the connection between rhetoric and medicine for the purposes of public speaking also helps to explain Plato's critique of writing that appears in the Phaedrus. Writing is not bad in and of itself, but it is disembodied writing-the form and style of writing that lacks a lively and life-like logos and is physiologically bankrupt-that Plato takes issue with. Socrates says that it "is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a disgrace … But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly". 44 Plato values live logos, and he detests what John Durham Peters calls "the disembodied presence of an absent other". 45 Plato, then, must have found a way to embody his own rhetoric if he himself was able to circumvent his own critique of writing and write well. He did so, I argue, by embodying his dialogues with the flavor of dialectical exchanges and by using the divine image of the human body in health as a blueprint for the structure 43 Phaedr., Ibid., 258d. of his texts. 46 It is the "cadaverous rigidity of writing, " as Derrida argues, that makes writing ineffective and dead. 47 Written discourse often lacks the vitality and intimacy afforded living logos, the logos of oral dialectic. The presence of speakers allows for a sort of give and take that writing can never replicate:
Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself. 48 Written discourse, for Plato, is disembodied from its author and stands indefensible against questioning. Furthermore, written discourse cannot discriminate among audiences, instead making itself available to anyone who wants to read it. According to Plato, discourse should be embodied; it should be a living, breathing discourse. Logos, as Derrida explains, is a living organism:
Logos, a living, animate creature, is thus also an organism that has been engendered. An organism: a differential body proper, with a center and extremities, joints, a head, and feet. In order to be "proper, " a written discourse ought to submit to the laws of life just as a living discourse does. 49 Since Plato conceived of the human body as a (more or less accurate) copy of, parallel to as it were, the divine form of human being which exists in the nonmaterial realm of Ideas, the immortal, perfect prototypes of the perishable, imperfect things we see around us, anything constructed in the body's image was similarly derived from a divine source. Therefore, Plato argues that good writing should also be modeled after the human body in its form and content, so as to be agreeable to the gods, divinely inspired, and resembling life. 50 Plato skirted his own criticism of writing by creating dialogues that reflect as closely as possible the live logos of dialectic. As Derrida explains, There is for Plato no such thing as a written thing. There is only a logos more or less alive, more or less distant from itself. Writing is not an independent order of signification; it is weakened speech, something not completely dead: a living-dead, a reprieved corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of breath. 51 Plato's dialogues, for the most part, are lively logoi. They are inspired by the search for true knowledge and they mimic the lively engagement of souls characteristic of dialectical exchanges.
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According to this corporeal theory of writing, we can also infer that Lysias' speech read by Phaedrus at the beginning of the dialogue is poorly constructed, because it fails to mimic the divine and organic structure of the human body. Acceptable writing has a corporeal structure, with bodily attributes. For Plato the form of the human body should dictate the literal composition of discourse. Every discourse, Socrates says, must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members (parts of the body), composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.
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The composition of discourse should correspond with and conform to the ideal constitution of the human body, and therefore discourse modeled after the structure of the human body is physiological and alive.
Socrates later continues discussing the principles of discourse by suggesting that it consists in dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver … just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this unit, it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness.
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Discourses can be modeled after the organic structure of the human body, and they can be disjointed and dissected in just the same manner. It is no wonder that Plato employs Hippocratic medicine to talk about writing since it is the physician who claims to know how all the parts of the body work together and is able to teach the rhetorician a comparable method for understanding the components of discourse. 51 As long as a discourse represents the harmony, order, and balance of the body, the orator cannot go wrong, because his speech will be in accordance with a divine form. Discourses that twist or violate the composition of the human form, however, can never be "true." Disembodied writing is not capable of responding to questions; it ceases to be physiologically active, balanced by opposites or composed of four humors; it is physiologically bankrupt, not a living and breathing presence.
Conclusion
This essay has demonstrated how in the process of trying to show rhetoric and medicine to be opposites, the distinction Plato draws between the two gets rearticulated as a potential similarity. The first hint we get of the unsteadiness of Plato's claim that they are opposites comes in the Gorgias, when Socrates distinguishes between good and bad oratory and, while he claims that Callicles has not witnessed good oratory before, he keeps open the possibility that good oratory can be a corrective to false rhetoric and a potentially positive way to cultivate the souls of an audience. The opposition between medicine and rhetoric begins to break down, however, when Plato advances the position that the rhetorician must know the souls of his auditors just as the doctor must know the bodies of his patients. Knowing the soul and knowing the body require more than just a priori knowledge, as Plato would initially have us believe. Additionally, the orator and the doctor share similar concerns with situational demands and matters of timeliness. At the end of the Phaedrus we find that rhetoric and medicine merge in the character of Pericles whose study of medicine with Anaxagoras is blended with his natural endowments in speech and rhetoric.
Lastly, this essay has shown that the overlooked connection between medicine and rhetoric helps to explain Plato's critique of writing in the Phaedrus. Plato is not claiming that all writing is bad, but only that form of writing that neglects the true nature of the body and soul and fails to infuse this knowledge into the literal construction of discourse. Good writing is physiologically active, modeled after the divine form reflected in the human body. Good writers, then, like good orators, must understand-as Pericles and Hippocrates do-the whole nature of man. 
